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Foreign direct investment is less important relative to the size of the Korean economy than it is for the Canadian economy, however. The stock of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in Korea in 2013 amounted to $167 billion or 13.7 percent of GDP; the stock of outward investment totaled only $42 billion or 3.2 percent of GDP. The comparable figures for Canada were inward investment of $645 billion, or 35.3 percent of GDP, and outward investment of $732 billion, or 40.1 percent of GDP (UNCTAD 2014).
In 2013, Korea imported US$4.7 billion from Canada, while Canada imported US$7.1 billion from Korea, resulting in a bilateral trade deficit of US$2.4 billion, in part reflecting higher Korean customs duties -the average of Korea's tariff lines is about 13.3 percent versus 4.3 percent for Canada. Three-quarters of Canada's imports from Korea were in vehicles, electronic equipment, and machinery and equipment. Korea's imports from Canada were more diversified, with mineral fuels the single largest category, but with significant contributions from a range of manufactured goods, ores and metals, forest products, agriculture and agri-foods, fertilizer, and the fishery (Table 2) .
Canadian-Korea bilateral trade in services has exhibited no significant trend, but with a noticeable dip in 2009 during the global economic and financial crisis. Neither country ranks especially high in the other's global market considerations.
Overall Results
We project the impacts of the CKFTA for Canada and Korea, respectively, over the period 2015 through 2035 (see Table 4 ).
Economic Welfare: We find the CKFTA has small but positive impacts on both Canada and Korea in terms of economic welfare (which takes into account changes stemming from the agreement in both the quantity of output and in prices) and real GDP (a measure of the impact on the quantity of output only). The gains for these indicators are comparable for both economies in percentage terms, but Canada gains somewhat more in dollar terms due to its higher starting levels on both indicators. In percentage terms, GDP is 0.05 percent higher in real To evaluate the CKFTA using this model, we project the global economy to 2035, drawing on available long-term macroeconomic projections. This "baseline" scenario describes the world as it would have been without the CKFTA. We then reduce tariffs between Canada and Korea according to the phase-in schedules in the agreement, and allow for the reduction of non-tariff barriers to goods trade, cross-border services trade and FDI flows.
In the simulations, we take into account the reality that not all trade transactions take advantage of the lower tariffs, because the latter are only available to firms that can demonstrate compliance with rules of origin (ROOs). ROOs under the CKFTA determine whether a product contains sufficient Canadian and Korean inputs to be eligible for the lower tariffs. The cost of complying with these rules, or even just of documenting compliance, is an important factor in terms of shaping the structural impacts of a trade agreement, since ROOs compliance affects primarily more complex manufactured products. Thus, some trade between Canada and Korea will likely remain subject to customs duties, even for items for which it would be possible to pay no duty under the agreement.
This study innovates in terms of how it quantifies the trade-liberalizing effect of the negotiated text on trade in services. We map the agreement's negotiated measures into changes to Canada's and Korea's Services Trade Restrictiveness Indexes (STRIs). Since changes in the STRIs can be linked to changes in trade through econometric techniques, this approach provides a much sharper evaluation of the impact of a trade agreement on services trade than is possible under alternative existing methods of estimating the liberalizing impact of a trade agreement.
terms when the full effects of the Agreement have been realized; Korea's gain in real GDP is slightly larger at 0.06 percent.
Two-Way Trade:
The boost to two-way trade and investment is substantially greater than to consumption, implying both a more open and competitive economy. Bilateral trade expands by $4.4 billion, or 22 percent, with Canada realizing a bilateral export gain of about $2.2 billion, an increase of 26 percent over the baseline, and Korea about $2.1 billion, or 19 percent over the baseline.
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Short-run impacts are small but build over time, reflecting not only the gradual phasing in of tariff cuts, but also the gradual response of investment to changed conditions. 
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Source of GDP Impacts: In Figure 1 , we show the separate impact on Canadian GDP of each of the five major features of liberalization under the CKFTA. For each year shown, a cluster of bars shows the cumulative percentage gain in GDP flowing from the CKFTA up to that year. The first bar shows the percentage gain due to tariff reductions. The second bar shows that this gain is reduced when we take account the under-utilization of lower tariffs due to costly rules of origin requirements, discussed in Box 1. Bar 3 shows that the net gain increases once non-tariff-barrier (NTB) reductions on goods are taken into account. The net gain rises still further when we account for reduction of NTBs in cross-border services trade -which the fourth bar does for each year. Finally, the fifth bar in each year, which shows the total gain in GDP stemming from all the liberalization features of the CKFTA up to that year, shows that there is only a very small net gain from additional FDI liberalization.
Our model provides insight into the impact of liberalization on trade through the commercial presence of one country's firms in another's territory. While the model does not represent each separate country as a foreign investor and, accordingly, it is not possible to precisely allocate foreign affiliate sales (FAS) in Korea to Canadian affiliates, we may interpret the change in FAS in Korea as the impact deriving from changes in Canadian investment. Likewise, we may interpret the change in FAS in Canada as deriving from changes in Korean investment. Our results indicate that the gain in foreign affiliate sales dominates the gains in cross-border trade. Accordingly, accounting for this mode of liberalization provides a much more complete picture of the impact of the CKFTA on Canada's overall services trade.
The Impacts on Specific Sectors
In terms of sector-specific impacts, the CKFTA expands Canadian agricultural output, especially beef and pork production, and boosts non-traded services (which are services produced and consumed domestically) through income effects. The deal, however, means more competition for Canada's heavy industry and manufacturing sectors (for complete sectoral details, see online Appendix 2).
While the Canadian automotive sector is negatively impacted, the predicted output decline (about $C 114 million or about -0.05 percent) is small compared to the close to $1.2 billion expansion of Korean auto exports to Canada. Korea's gains are largely at the expense of third countries' imports into Canada; the impact on Canada's automotive sector is also softened by the overall Canadian income gains from the deal, which spur overall demand. Evaluating the deal from a multinational firm perspective, however, Korean firms gain at the expense of US and Japanese firms.
For Korea, the deal expands auto sector and transportation equipment exports in particular, followed by machinery and equipment and chemicals. In terms of production gains, the biggest gainers after the automotive sector are non-traded services, while the beef sector and food products more generally experience relatively modest declines. These production declines are small compared to the inroads in the Korean market made by Canada, since these inroads come in good measure at the expense of third countries. Indeed, overall, the impact of the CKFTA on third parties is negative, reflecting the effects of trade diversion. Notably, due to the CKFTA, not all of the bilateral export gains anticipated by the United States and Australia from their agreements with Korea will in fact be realized. By the same token, insofar as the CKFTA is implemented contemporaneously with the US and Australian deals, in large measure these diverted gains will not be experienced by Canadian exporters -rather they stand as an "absence of loss" compared to a situation where Australia and the United States would have expanded preferential access at Canada's expense. This effect illustrates the pressures underlying the "domino theory" of FTAs: once major countries enter into FTAs, there is pressure on other trading partners to cut their own deals to mitigate competitive losses in those markets (Baldwin 1995; Ciuriak 2010) .
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Other Issues Affecting Canada-Korea Trade
Circumstances appear to be relatively propitious for Canada to improve on its bilateral trade performance since Korea's macroeconomic fundamentals are supporting a gradual rise in the exchange value of the Korean e-Brief currency -the won -which has already unwound some of the persistent undervaluation, noted by the IMF (2014b), that followed its depreciation in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008-09. Meanwhile, the Canadian dollar's recent correction has brought its market exchange rate more in line with purchasing power parity. These developments have brought the real effective exchange rate of the Canadian dollar back closer to its historical average vis-à-vis the won (Figure 2 ). However, Canada should carefully monitor any renewed attempt by the Bank of Korea to keep the won artificially low.
In addition, while Korea's flurry of FTAs 5 provides all the appearance of aggressive liberalization, Korea has been the target of complaints in the context of its agreement with the United States of applying heightened scrutiny to claims for preferential treatment in the form of demands for documentation and on-site visits to supply chain suppliers to assess compliance with rules of origin. While Korea's requirements are understood as within the bounds of the US deal, US firms have complained that the Korean zeal in enforcing the agreement amounts to "excessive" documentation requirements. Other measures contested by US exporters include environmental standards, consumer protection regulations, and the equivalency of standards. 
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Furthermore, we note that while it is governments that cut trade deals, it is companies that trade. The Korean economy features complex corporate connections through the chaebol system, which are groups of formally independent firms linked to a controlling family. Korea's top 10 chaebol account for 80 percent of its GDP, with the Samsung Group alone accounting for 28 percent (Lee 2013) . Governments can sign formal treaties but business must penetrate these webs of corporate and personal relationships. Social capital remains important in Korean business (Witt 2013) . Accordingly, for Canada to derive the benefits that the CKFTA promises on paper, relationships will have to be cultivated, business-to-business as well as government-to-government.
In short, Canadians should be aware that it is one thing to negotiate a deal but another thing to ensure that the initialed texts translate into measurable trade impacts. 1.80 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 4 January 1995=100
Conclusion
Overall, we find that the CKFTA will likely have a small but positive impact on Canada. 6 In terms of the structural impacts, the CKFTA tends to reinforce existing patterns of comparative advantage between Canada and Korea: for Canada, the agricultural sector gains and, for Korea, the industrial sector gains. In both economies, the major output gains otherwise come in non-traded services sectors, driven by the deal's income effects.
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In considering these findings, the reader should bear in mind two important considerations. First, these simulations attempt to show the economic value of undertakings that Canada and Korea have made -all else being equal. All else will not of course be equal.
Second, the numbers make no claim to precision. The model -however complex it may be -is a great simplification of reality. The numbers do, however, serve to identify the likely dimensions of the ballpark in which the CKFTA will play itself out and so help to anchor public discourse in quantitative reality.
At the same time, as we noted, the extent to which the expected benefits of the KORUS have materialized remains under intense scrutiny in the United States. This and other factors mentioned above suggest careful monitoring of the extent to which Canadian producers do in fact benefit from the improved access to the Korean market that the CKFTA promises.
